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Comments
THE RESPONSIVE VERDICT IN LOUISIANA
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A verdict in a criminal proceeding is the answer of the jury
made upon a cause committed by the court to their examination.
This verdict must be responsive, according to Article 405, Code
of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
"The verdict must be responsive to the indictment, that is to
say, no one can be found guilty of an offense not charged in
the indictment or not necessarily included in the offense
charged ......
The problem, of course, arises in determining what is and
what is not a responsive verdict. There has been a paucity of liti-
gation in this field, especially since the adoption of the Criminal
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Code.' And, of those cases, many are not satisfactory as explana-
tory of the responsive verdict. By carefully analyzing the remain-
ing cases it is possible to draw certain conclusions which may
crystallize somewhat the present conception of the responsive
verdict.
Several general propositions may first be stated. A verdict of
"guilty as charged" naturally is responsive. A verdict in the jury's
own language is responsive if the offense is completely stated and
is the same crime as charged in the indictment. It is sufficient to
define a crime as murder or manslaughter or bigamy because
they are in themselves definitions, but if it is not so identifiable
by name, the description must include the essentials to constitute
the crime.2 The court may never supply the intendment in a
jury's verdict; unless the verdict is complete in itself, it is in-
valid.' In, graded crimes, such as theft, the verdict must precisely
fix the nature of the offense.4
The difficulty arises when a verdict is returned which finds
the defendant guilty of some crime other than that charged in
the indictment. It must be determined whether the crime con-
victed of is of a nature which is responsive to the crime charged.
In attempting to evolve a criteria it is necessary to divide the
litigation into two groups: that which is based upon the generic
offense theory, and that which is based upon the lesser included
offense theory.
THE GENERIC THEORY
The generic theory is that which divides crimes into various
large categories with individual crimes constituting the species
thereunder. As an example, murder and manslaughter are spe-
cies under the genus homicide, and hence are generic offenses;
murder and aggravated battery are species belonging to a differ-
ent genus, homicide and assault and battery respectively, and
thus are not generic offenses.
One of the earlier cases which intimated that the crimes
must be generic was State v. Guillory.5 A verdict of guilty of an
assault with intent to murder was returned to a murder indict-
ment. The verdict was annulled as not responsive because the
1 La. Crim. Code of 1942.
2. State v. French, 50 La. Ann. 461, 23 So. 606 (1898).
3. State v. Evans, 49 La. Ann. 329, 21 So. 546 (1897); State v. Jefferson,
120 La. 116, 44 So. 1004 (1907); State v. Johnson, 133 La. 63, 62 So. 407 (1913);
State v. Ward, 147 La. 1083, 86 So. 552 (1920).
4. State v. Glenn, 153 La. 147, 95 So. 534 (1923); State v. Pace, 174 La.
295, 140 So. 482 (1932).
5. 42 La. Ann. 581, 7 So. 690 (1890).
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two offenses were separate and distinct, were not of the same
generic class, and the lesser was not included in the greater. It
is impossible to determine exactly how much weight was given
to the generic theory, but certainly it was a factor in the decision.
A very clear example of what is generic is furnished by State
v. Foster,0 in which there was an indictment for shooting with a
dangerous weapon with intent to murder. The defendant request-
ed charges to the jury that he could be found guilty of shooting
with intent to kill, of assault with a dangerous weapon, of assault
and battery, or of simple assault. The court granted his request
for the charge of guilty of shooting with intent to kill, but refused
to give the other charges.' In reaching this conclusion the court
said: "while the charge of shooting with intent to murder in-
cludes an assault and an assault with a dangerous weapon . . .
it would be going too far . . . to sanction such verdicts." It is
true that no specific mention was made of generic classes, but
the thought behind the reasoning is obvious.
A peculiar situation arose in State v. Foster.8 The indictment
was worded in such a manner that it combined the offenses of in-
flicting a wound less than mayhem with a dangerous weapon
and assault with a dangerous weapon. It was held that verdicts
of guilty of assault and battery and guilty of assault would be
responsive." They would not be responsive under a straight
"wounding less than mayhem" indictment; but under this par-
ticular indictment which charged a crime of the assault genus
the assault verdicts were responsive, the reason of course being
that they were of the same generic class as the indictment.
In State v. Ritchie,1° the defendant was charged with em-
bezzlement of $350.00, but was convicted of obtaining that sum
by false pretenses. Although the Code of Criminal Procedure1
6. 150 La. 971, 91 So. 411 (1922).
7. Accord: State v. Cole, 158 La. 799, 104 So. 720 (1925). A verdict of guilty
of cutting with a dangerous weapon with intent to kill was held responsive
to an indictment of cutting with a dangerous weapon with intent to murder,
because the crimes are of the same generic class and the verdict was for a
lesser included crime.
8. 149 La. 521, 89 So. 680 (1921).
9. But cf. State v. Van Zelden, 178 La. 884, 152 So. 554 (1933). The defend-
ant was charged with inflicting with a dangerous weapon a wound less than
mayhem and he requested a charge of guilty of assault and battery. Held,
not responsive; the crime could not have been committed without an assault,
but they are not of the same generic class.
10. 172 La. 942, 136 So. 11 (1931).
11. Art. 407, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, which reads: "Whenever
larceny, embezzlement, obtaining by false pretenses or swindling is charged
in an indictment a verdict of guilty of any one of the offenses is responsive.
." But a verdict of swindling would not be responsive because there is
no such crime. State v. Trippett, 184 La. 532, 166 So. 665 (1936).
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specifically stated this was responsive, there was a contention
that the verdict was not responsive. The verdict was upheld on
appeal, the supreme court saying that the crimes were of the
same generic class in that "each relates -to the same ultimate,
unlawful purpose or design, that of fraudulently depriving an-
other of his property," and that the crime of embezzlement in-
cluded the lesser crime of obtaining by false pretenses. Thus, the
decision was based both upon the generic theory and the lesser
included offense theory.
The indictment in the leading case of State v. Surrency
1 2
was for the crime of shooting with a dangerous weapon with in-
tent to murder while lying in wait. The judge charged the jury
that a verdict of guilty of shooting with a dangerous weapon with
intent to murder or of guilty of shooting with a dangerous wea-
pon with intent to kill would be responsive, while the defendant
contended they were not responsive. In holding those possible
verdicts responsive, the court asked, "What is the genus of the
offense?" The answer was "shooting with a dangerous weapon."
The crimes were generic offenses, but each was a different species,
which the court explained as merely the doing of the act under
different circumstances. The entire decision here was based upon
the generic theory,, which makes it outstanding authority.
From these cases it seems evident that in order for a verdict
to be responsive to the indictment the crimes must be generic.
But it is impossible to conclude that all generic offenses are re-
sponsive to one another.
THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE THEORY
Each crime is comprised of certain essential elements. These
elements must be present if there is to be a crime. A lesser in-
cluded crime is one which is composed of some, but not all, of
the elements of the crime of greater degree, but has no element
not a part of the greater crime. The greater crime of aggravated
assault, thus, would include the lesser offense of simple assault
because simple assault is made up of all the elements of aggra-
vated assault except one-the use of a dangerous weapon. Under
the lesser offense theory a verdict of guilty of a crime of a lesser
degree than the one specified in the indictment is responsive.13
12. 148 La. 983, 88 So. 240 (1921).
13. Art. 406, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, specifically makes verdicts
for lesser included crimes responsive: "When the crime charged includes an-
other of lesser grade, a verdict of guilty of the lesser crime is responsive to
the indictment, and it is of no moment that the greater offense is a felony
and the lesser a misdemeanor."
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The most prominent authority in this field is State v.
Jacques. 14 There was an indictment for cutting with a dangerous
weapon with intent to murder, and the defendant requested a
charge of guilty of inflicting a wound less than mayhem with a
dangerous weapon. It was refused as not responsive on the ground
that the indictment did not contain the necessary averments
requisite for the crime. In the much quoted words of the court-
"When the charge for the major offense necessarily includes a
charge for the minor, a verdict to either is responsive, provided,
always, that all the necessary allegations to charge the minor of-
fense are pleaded in the indictment or information"'5-there was
created a qualification." The requested charge would have been
responsive if the indictment had contained the essential allega-
tions of wounding less than mayhem. The verdict rendered, guil-
ty of cutting with a dangerous weapon with intent to kill, was
responsive; it was an included offense in that crime charged and
all vital allegations were present in the indictment.
However, the crimes of assault and battery and assault were
also charged as responsive verdicts in State v. Jacques. 7 This has
since been seemingly overruled by State v. Smith" in which the
indictment charged cutting with a dangerous weapon with intent
to kill, and a charge of guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon
was requested. It was denied as unresponsive on the ground that
the indictment followed the words of the statute which did not
charge or denounce an "assault," an essential ingredient in the
crime of assault with a dangerous weapon. Since assault with a
dangerous weapon was held not responsive, assault and battery
and assault would not be responsive, notwithstanding the
Jacques9 case.
A very recent case, State v. Antoine,20 has followed this pat-
tern. It was very properly held that a verdict of guilty of inflict-
ing a wound less than mayhem was not responsive to an indict-
ment for cutting with a dangerous weapon with intent to murder
for the same reasons stated in the Jacques21 case; and the court
14. 45 La. Ann. 1451, 14 So. 213 (1893).
15. 45 La. Ann. 1451, 1453, 14 So. 213, 214 (1893).
16. The same situation was presented in State v. Mitchell, 153 La. 585,
96 So. 130 (1923). State v. Jacques, 45 La. Ann. 1451, 14 So. 213 (1893) was
quoted and precisely the same decision was rendered. State v. Antoine, 189
La. 619, 180 So. 465 (1938), a recent case, quoted this language approvingly.
17. 45 La. Ann. 1451, 14 So. 213 (1893).
18. 171 La. 452, 131 So. 296 (1930).
19. 45 La. Ann. 1451, 14 So. 213 (1893).
20. 189 La. 619, 180 So. 465 (1938).
21. 45 La. Ann. 1451, 14 So. 213 (1893).
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also held that a verdict of guilty of assault with a dangerous wea-
pon would not be responsive, citing and quoting State v. Smith.22
In analyzing the Smith28 case and the reiteration of its holding
in State v. Antoine,2 - one may wonder why "cutting with a dan-
gerous weapon" does not include an "assault." In the writer's
opinion, "cutting with a dangerous weapon" is an aggravated
form of battery and necessarily includes an assault, which may
consist of an attempted battery.
The remainder of the cases based upon the lesser included
offense theory make no attempt to explain further, but merely
state whether, in that particular instance, the verdict is an in-
cluded crime and responsive or not. It has been held that larceny
is not responsive to breaking and entering; 25 striking with a dan-
gerous weapon with intent to kill is responsive to striking with
a dangerous weapon with intent to murder;2 8 entering in the
nighttime without breaking with intent to steal is responsive to
breaking and entering in the nighttime with intent to steal;
27
petty larceny is responsive to grand larceny;28 assault with intent
to kill is not responsive to murder;29 and larceny is not responsive
to robbery unless the amount stolen is definitely stated.,' From
the cases it will be seen that a verdict of guilty of the lesser crime
is responsive only when the indictment includes all elements of
such crime.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it seems that a definite criteria may be estab-
lished. A double test is created-using both the generic offense
theory and the lesser included offense theory-which may be
easily applied to determine the responsiveness of a verdict.
22. 171 La. 452, 131 So. 296 (1930). A contention was made in the brief that
assault and battery would be responsive, but counsel conceded in the oral
argument that it was without merit.
23. 171 La. 452, 131 So. 296 (1930).
24. 189 La. 619, 180 So. 465 (1938).
25. State v. Montcrieffe, 165 La. 296, 115 So. 493 (1928).
26. State v. Penton, 157 La. 68, 102 So. 14 (1924); State v. Bourgeois, 158
La. 713, 104 So. 627 (1925).
An interesting situation has arisen in this class of litigation. The statute
(Art. 764, Dart's Code of Criminal Procedure [1932], now repealed) denounc-
ed shooting, stabbing, cutting, striking or thrusting with a dangerous weapon
with intent to murder. It has been held that all verdicts finding this crime
must contain the words "with a dangerous weapon" in order to be respon-
sive, except when the offense is "shooting." The position of the court is that
to insert the phrase would be tautological. State v. Young, 187 La. 342, 174
So. 665 (1937); State v. Coco, 203 La. 424, 14 So. (2d) 45 (1943).
27. State v. Barber, 167 La. 635, 120 So. 33 (1929).
28. State v. Kelly, 176 La. 405, 146 So. 6 (1933).
29. State v. Guillory, 42 La. Ann. 581, 7 So. 690 (1890).
30. State v. Pace, 174 La. 295, 140 So. 482 (1932).
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First, all essential elements of the lesser offenses must be in-
cluded in the indictment for the offense charged. Second, the
generic offenses must be segregated from the non-generic of-
fenses. To do this, the genus of the crime charged in the indict-
ment is determined, and each of the lesser crimes compared with
it. If the lesser crime is of the same generic class, it is responsive;
if not, it is not responsive. If the lesser offense meets both of these
tests it may be the subject of a valid and "responsive" verdict.
It is submitted that this technique offers a workable solution
to the problem of the responsive verdict.
B. NEWTON HARGIS
CAN A USUFRUCT BE STIPULATED FOR A TERM?
A proposition which seems to have been tacitly assumed is
that a usufruct may be stipulated by convention to last for a cer-
tain term, for example, I give to X the usufruct of Sabine Farm
for five years. In a recent Civil Law Seminar some doubt was
expressed as to the legal basis on which this proposition had been
assumed to rest. A perusal of nearly two hundred cases1 decided
under the Louisiana Civil Code "Usufruct" articles demonstrated
that there was no judicial precedent for stipulating a usufruct for
a term.2 Some twenty-odd law review articles dealing with usu-
fruct gave no hint as to the answer to this problem, nor even
contemplated its possibilities. As for actual Written law, only
two Code articles appeared to be pertinent: 3
Art. 542, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870: "Usufruct may be
established simply, or to take place at a certain day, or under
1. Citation of cases would be superfluous. Needless to say, they may
be found listed by Shepard under the "Usufruct" articles of the Louisiana
Civil Codes of 1808, 1825, and 1870.
2. No aid is afforded to the solution of the problem by the fact that
a mineral servitude may be stipulated for a term. "A so-called mineral
servitude . . . is not a 'personal servitude' within strict legal meaning." Ford
v. Williams, 189 La. 229, 236, 179 So. 298, 300 (1938). The creation of this
hybrid mineral servitude device was forced upon the court by the legisla-
ture's inaction.
3. A possible exception is Art. 610, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The usufruct
granted until a third person shall arrive at a certain age, lasts until that
time, although the third person should die before the age fixed on." This
appears to authorize stipulation of a usufruct to last for a term deter-
mined by the time necessary for a third person to arrive at a certain age.
This would be a usufruct under condition if it were not for the clause,
"although the third person should die before the age fixed on." Conceding
that this permits such a term usufruct, would not other term usufructs-
the dies ad quem class--be considered unauthorized under the rule, expres-
sio unius est exclusto alterius"?
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